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I n 2003 the European Union (EU) adopted the European SecurityStrategy, the first ever strategic document providing long-termguidance for the whole of EU foreign policy. The Strategy calls for the
EU to be ‘more active’ in pursuing its strategic objectives, through a
holistic approach putting to use ‘the full spectrum of instruments for
crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic,
military and civilian, trade and development activities’. ‘Spreading good
governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and
protecting human rights’ should produce ‘a world of well-governed
democratic states’ – this overall method and objective can be described
as ‘effective multilateralism’. 
And active the EU has become, including in the diplomatic and
military field. At the time of writing, in early 2007, no less than 11
civilian and military crisis management operations were ongoing in
the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
across the globe: the Balkans, Palestine, Sudan, DR Congo, Aceh…
Together, these involved about 8.000 troops and 500 civilians. Many
more troops from EU Member States, up to 80.000 in total, were
simultaneously deployed in other frameworks: on national operations,
as UN blue helmets, on NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan,
and, still, in the coalition of the willing in Iraq. On the diplomatic
front, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, travels around the world as the voice of
the EU in preventive diplomacy. The EU together with its Member
States already is a global security actor to be reckoned with, much
more so than many people realize. 
The two probably most salient examples of a ‘more active’ EU are to be
found in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the EU has taken the lead in
providing troops for a reinforced United Nations Interin Force in Libanon
(UNIFIL). Hopes are that this is the beginning of a renewed activism
towards the region, not only on the domestic situation in Lebanon and
its relations with Israel, but also on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. In
Iran, the ‘EU3’ (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) are leading
negotiations on nuclear proliferation. 
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Both cases can be seen as positive examples of an EU that is more
united and hence ‘more active’, living up to the ambitions of the
European Security Strategy. Yet, on closer inspection they also provoke
a number of fundamental strategic questions, on the ambitions and
potential of EU policy towards the region, but also on the broader issue
of the overall scope of the EU as a global strategic actor. These
questions the EU inevitably will have to confront if it continues its ‘more
active’ role in the Middle East. 
The EU and the Middle East 
The first question that rises concerns the objectives of EU policy: which
end-state does the EU desire in the Middle East? This immediately leads
to the question whether the instruments at the disposal of the EU are
sufficient to achieve those objectives. 
Iran 
With regard to Iran, the short-term objective is to prevent the country from
acquiring a military nuclear capacity and ensuring that any civilian nuclear
programmes are put under the complete supervision of the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency). In order to achieve that aim, the EU
has consciously opted for negotiations rather than the – immediate – use
of force, thus clearly presenting an alternative way of dealing with
proliferation issues as compared to the US reaction to the alleged
proliferation threat posed by Iraq. Whether this approach will ultimately be
successful is difficult to predict. It has been successful so far to the extent
that war has been avoided – while according to well-informed sources the
US was at some point on the brink of going to war – and that for a while
Iran suspended its enrichment activities. To have demonstrated that an
alternative way based on ‘effective multilateralism’ exists, and can be
applied in concrete cases, in itself can also be regarded as a success. 
Implementing this approach in the case of Iran also raises numerous
issues however:
• By its very nature, the process of negotiations is a very drawn-out
one. The difficulty is how to judge when negotiations have failed or at
least necessitate a next step. Presumably, the EU will show more
patience than the US and Israel, but the process can not go on
indefinitely either. After the imposition of sanctions by the UN
Security Council (UNSC) in December 2006, a new diplomatic
initiative is required, for by themselves the sanctions will not lead to a
solution. 
• In the negotiations, the EU has put rather more emphasis on the
proverbial carrot than ‘classic’ coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless one
must ask whether negotiations can only succeed if at the same time
diplomacy is backed up by a credible threat of force. For the EU, the
question is whether the use of force can be envisaged at all, in view of
the ambiguous nature of the case. Iran has the legal right to develop a
civilian nuclear capacity. Because of a lack of compliance with the
supervision mechanisms provided by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
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the suspicion has arisen that Iran has military intentions, but no positive
proof is available. Can force be used without such proof? 
• The answer to this question is related to the threat assessment. Is the
threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran sufficient to warrant military
intervention? Apart from the damage to the NPT-regime (which has
already been damaged by the US nuclear deal with India), any military
threat would be mainly ‘South to South’, i.e. against Iran’s
neighbouring countries rather than against the EU. More generally,
one should not equate possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) with the intention to use them. Assuming that intervention is
technically possible and that the capabilities are available, would the
negative effects – strengthening of the regime by providing an
external enemy, reinforcing the image of a clash between Islam and
the West and furthering radicalization worldwide, and, simply, people
getting killed – not be too important? The threat assessment of the
EU on the one hand and the US and Israel on the other hand seems
to be substantially different. 
• The US has subscribed to the EU approach, even though perhaps
more out of necessity than out of conviction. More active, positive
engagement with Iran from the part of the US would greatly facilitate
the process. At the same time, Iran should refrain from negative
involvement in Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). 
Less obvious are the EU’s long-term objectives vis-à-vis Iran. If the
current regime is not much liked in the capitals of Europe, it must be
borne in mind that its stance on the nuclear issue is shared by most if
not all opposition actors. Is it the EU’s aim to promote wider – political,
social, economic – reforms in Iran and, if so, how will it go about it? 
Lebanon and Israel-Palestine 
Unlike Iran, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine are dealt with in the context of
the elaborate policy frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Even if questions can
be asked regarding the desired end-state and the feasibility of the
ENP/EMP, notably with regard to the more authoritarian neighbouring
countries, these are the three most democratic partners in the
Mediterranean, hence EU objectives towards them in the political, social
and economic field are both clearer and more feasible. With regard to the
security dimension however, even if numerous EU documents clearly state
the desired end-state, the feasibility of that solution is much more
questionable:
• Past experience shows that only a concerted EU-US initiative has any
hope of success in furthering the Middle East Peace Process. It is
highly unlikely however that any initiative will be forthcoming from
the US side before the 2008 presidential elections. Positive steps in
the MEPP could otherwise be linked to negotiations with Iran and the
need for it to halt any negative involvement. European and American
views on Israel-Palestine remain fundamentally different. The US
decision to invade Iraq rather than take an initiative on the MEPP as a
way of increasing legitimacy and reform in the Middle East is the
clearest example of this divide. 
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• The question is therefore what the EU can hope to achieve in the
absence of an American initiative, first of all with regard to the
National Palestinian Authority. The decision to limit relations and
support following the Hamas election victory, which contrasted
sharply with established EU policy, seems to have been taken under
US pressure. A reassessment is now in order, to establish how the EU
can most effectively influence developments in the National
Palestinian Authority, notably in the field of effective government and
prevention of the use of force, making use of the different
instruments of support at its disposal. 
• The same question – which leverage does the EU have in the absence
of US action – poses itself with regard to Lebanon. Through its
substantial participation in the enlarged UNIFIL, the EU has certainly
increased its presence in the region. The fact itself that various actors
called on the EU to provide the core of UNIFIL is proof of its enhanced
standing. Yet, UNIFIL will not disarm Hezbollah – it will demilitarize
the border region and basically buys time for a political process that
should integrate all actors in a democratic Lebanese polity. Only in
such a wider political framework can SSR/DDR1 schemes result in the
integration of the armed Hezbollah in a united Lebanese army. Does
the EU have the leverage to put this process in motion, given the
linkages with outside actors and developments in the broader region,
notably on Iran? In any case, the EU should shoulder the responsibility
to at least launch such a process, or the window of opportunity will
be closed. 
• EU-Israel relations seem to have been further strained by recent
developments. In Europe, the ongoing use of force in the Palestinian
territories is widely seen as disproportionate to the threat and as
highlighting the absence of any attempt at constructive engagement.
Ongoing incursions into the UNIFIL zone – and incidents such as the
fir ing at a German ship – can also be seen as a lack of
constructiveness and pose the question of whether and how the EU –
and European forces in UNIFIL – should react. 
The EU as a Global Strategic Actor 
The current commitment of the EU in the Middle East is proof of its
growing international actorness. Vis-à-vis Iran, the EU is playing a
proactive role and is leading the international negotiations – and has
been accepted as such by the international community. That an
initially reluctant US have subscribed to this approach, and escalation
has so far been prevented, is an important achievement. In Lebanon,
the scale of the European deployment – 8.000 troops – and the fact
that initially the option of making it an ESDP operation was seriously
considered – but in the end not pursued because only the UN
framework was acceptable to all parties on the ground, while
interestingly NATO never was an option – are clear indications of the
EU’s growing military actorness. 
At the same time, its implication in the Middle East highlights a number
of broader strategic challenges for the EU which it will have to confront
if it continues its development into a fully-fledged global actor. 
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1. SSR: “Security Sector Reform” and
DDR: “Disarmament, Demobilisation
and Reintegration”.
• In the EU view, the use of force can only be an instrument of last resort
and, in principle, with a UNSC mandate, hence e.g. the preference for a
diplomatic process of negotiations to settle the Iranian nuclear problem.
Inevitably, there will be cases however when it will come to this
ultimate stage, when the choice is between inaction and forceful
action. The question is whether EU Member States are willing to
consider the use of force in an ESDP framework. Even though most
Member States do put their forces in harm’s way in national, NATO or
coalitions-of-the-willing operations, and although legally the Petersberg
Tasks include operations at the high end of the spectrum of violence,
politically the Member States are still extremely divided over the EU’s
level of ambition in this field. As Member States rest divided, in crisis
situations the EU-level is more often than not out of the loop.
Consequently, even though the EU has proven that it can mount high-
risk operations if the political will is present, most EU-led operations are
of lower intensity and often of smaller scale. The still very young ESDP
needs a number of successes to legitimize itself, hence the tendency to
select operations with a large chance of success. To some extent
therefore the criticism is justified that the EU takes on important but
mostly ‘easy’ operations, in the post-conflict phase, in reaction to the
settlement of a conflict – a criticism which can of course be applied to
the international community as a whole. One must thus question
whether the Member States are willing to fully accept the implications
of the strong EU diplomatic support for the principle of ‘responsibility to
protect’ (R2P) that was endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in
September 2005. R2P implies that if a State is unable or unwilling to
protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide,
ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national
sovereignty must give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of
the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must
mandate intervention, if necessary by military means, which per
definition implies high-intensity operations. Does not fully-fledged
global actorness imply the capacity, and the will, to engage in
autonomous high-intensity operations if necessary? Which criteria will
the EU use to determine whether to engage or not? The EU cannot
save the world and intervene in every single crisis, but activation of the
R2P mechanism or a crisis in regions of vital interest, including the
Middle East, seem to be minimal criteria. But what about the Caucasus
or Central Asia, or energy supply? 
• The leading role played by the EU3 in the negotiations with Iran led to
criticism from other Member States, who felt excluded from the
decision-making process, even after the involvement of Solana.
Council. Are institutionalized mechanisms needed to deal with such
scenarios? Or would the EU Foreign Minister and European External
Action Service as provided for in the draft Constitutional Treaty be the
answer? In any case, EU engagement in the Middle East once again
firmly demonstrates that the Member States can only hope to
influence the course of events if they act as one, as EU. 
• The US is the most important ally of the EU, with whom it shares
basic values and, mostly, overall objectives, though not always the
approach to achieve those objectives. More and more, the basic
strategic views of the EU and the US are diverging, as is proved by the
fact that even the EU Member States that supported the invasion of
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Iraq opted for an alternative course of action vis-à-vis Iran. For the
greater part, this divergence is likely to be structural. As the EU
emerges as a strategic actor in its own right, the alliance with the US
has to become more balanced. In the Middle East especially joint EU-
US initiatives are in order. Are the current mechanisms for dialogue
between Europe and the US sufficient to allow for coordination of
policy and, most importantly, to generate new policies? 
• The EU as a matter of principle operates via the collective security
system of the UN. The UNSC is regarded as the ‘ultimate arbiter in the
case of non-compliance’, as the EU Strategy on WMD words it. This
approach can only work if the Permanent 5 at least adopt a non-
obstructive, if not a cooperative attitude. The same holds true for the
conditionality-based holistic approach and the use of sanctions. The
case of Iran is an excellent example. ‘Strategic partnership’ with Russia
and China is thus essential for the implementation of ‘effective
multilateralism’. How to give more substance to existing partnerships
is another challenge for the EU. 
Conclusion 
The EU has come a long way in a very short time. But it is not a mature
strategic actor yet – as the cases of Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine
show, certain doctrines and instruments have to be further developed.
The EU’s neighbourhood, comprising the Middle East, the Caucasus and
extending to the Gulf, comprises many of the most important
challenges for the world as a whole. Furthermore, developments in this
region are inter-related: policies on Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine
are not only mutually dependent, but the room for manoeuvre is also
determined by developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In dealing with its
own region, the EU must effectively become a global power. 
But the lack of complementarity with current US policy on the region
puts the EU for a dilemma. If the EU does now not continue its active
policies, the image of powerlessness will be confirmed. If however it
does act, but fails because of a lack of constructive US activity, the result
will be the same. This dilemma does not contradict the fact that the EU
is ever increasing its actorness, but just confirms that in today’s
globalized world no one power can solve complex crises by itself –
neither the EU, nor the US. The EU cannot afford not to act – and the
US must consider whether a failure would really be in its interest.
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